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COMMISSION

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SUBJECT: U.S.-RUSSIAN DISCUSSION OF U.S.-PROPOSED DRAFT
JOINT STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR SECURITY, FEB 11, 2005, PARIS

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR LINTON BROOKS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (S) SUMMARY. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and National Nuclear Security Administrator Linton Brooks held fruitful meetings with Director of the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy (Rosatom) Alexandr Rumyantsev to discuss a possible U.S.-Russian joint statement on counter terrorism and preventing the spread of WMD to be issued at the time of the Presidential Summit in Bratislava. The discussion was based on the US draft joint statement Secretary Rice gave to Foreign Minister Lavrov in Ankara. Possible joint statement topics discussed include expanding efforts to: secure civil nuclear facilities, convert research reactor cores from highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, exchange nuclear security best practices, respond to nuclear emergencies, combat terrorism, and complete joint nuclear warhead and material security work by 2008. The Russians opposed a joint statement on nuclear security, but may be willing to include a brief statement on nuclear security issues as a part of a larger summit document.

2. (SBU) The Secretary was accompanied by an interagency team from the Departments of State, Energy and Defense. Director Rumyantsev was accompanied by representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense and Rosatom.

ONE-ON-ONE

3. (SBU) Secretary Bodman and Director Rumyantsev met separately in a private meeting prior to the main discussions and will be reported separately SEPTEL to follow. END SUMMARY.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

4. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed cooperation in the area of emergency response and consequence management.

5. (S) The Russian side felt that this was not a new initiative because we had ongoing collaboration in this area and stated it was not suitable for the Summit statement. They did, however, respond positively to the idea of increasing current cooperation in this area. In particular, they pointed out the Rosatom transportation exercise at Sarov in the fall of 2003 and the MoD exercise conducted in Murmansk in late 2004 as examples of successful exercises conducted by the Russian Federation and attended by representatives of the USG. Both sides agreed that discussing mutual problems in the area of emergency response and consequence management was extremely beneficial.

NUCLEAR SECURITY AT CIVILIAN FACILITIES

6. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed increased collaboration in the area of security at civilian nuclear facilities through exchange of technical experts, best practices and threat information.

7. (S) The Russian side responded positively to this proposal. They noted that significant cooperation was underway already, but want to increase the number of joint table-top exercises and other exchanges. In particular, the Russians have unilaterally begun to work on such issues. They have conducted psychological studies, for instance, to examine the insider threat. They conduct an exercise each year at one of their ten nuclear power plants. Such exercises last two to three weeks. They also noted with concern the issue of vulnerabilities at civilian sites from aircraft attack and would like to exchange views on this. The Russian Duma is considering legislation to close airspace over such plants to facilitate air defense operations. The Russian side cautioned that information from this kind of exchange was extremely sensitive and should be protected accordingly to avoid revealing vulnerabilities to possible terrorists. All

agencies encouraged future work in this area. The U.S. side said that it would provide concrete proposals in this area.

RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL CONVERSION

18. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing a Joint Coordinating Committee to oversee development of new LEU fuels to replace HEU fuels currently in use in U.S. and Russian research reactors. The U.S. also proposed accelerating repatriation of both U.S.- and Russian-origin HEU spent nuclear fuel.

19. (S) The Russian side agreed that it was in our mutual interest to continue efforts to develop alternative LEU fuels to convert existing research reactors. The Russian side did not believe that it would be technologically possible to develop alternative LEU fuels for all research reactors, particularly high-flux reactors. The Russian side was uncomfortable with describing schedules as "accelerated," and felt that the pace of the work was adequate, adding that the word "acceleration" had a negative connotation to the Russians; they associate the word with the programs of "acceleration and perestroika" of the Gorbachev era, and not in a favorable way. On an encouraging note, when Brooks pushed for a timetable because "we don't have a great deal of time left" to get this work done, Rumyantsev noted that we both have only four years to complete all of our work.

NUCLEAR SECURITY WORK

10. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed establishing firm deadlines to complete cooperative security upgrades at Rosatom and Ministry of Defense nuclear material and warhead storage sites by 2008. Brooks noted that the proposed dates did not have to be made public, but that we must set a schedule by which this work will be completed. Brooks further noted that to complete work at Rosatom sites, the U.S. technical teams would have to be granted access to the last remaining sites to be secured, the serial production enterprises (SPEs).

11. (S) The Russia side indicated that the SPEs were "pretty secure" already and Rosatom had adequate technology and funding for site security. Therefore, Russia no longer felt U.S. assistance was necessary at the last two SPEs. The Russians noted that no foreigner had ever visited the two active SPEs but he did offer to seek authority to allow U.S. personnel access to the "living areas" of one SPE in order to verify that security was sufficient. When pressed, the Russians could not guarantee access, but have already begun working with the appropriate agencies to allow such a visit.

12. (C) With regard to MOD sites, the Russians agreed to provide the U.S. with a list of sites that required security upgrades by mid to late summer.

13. (C) The MOD also mentioned that they would like true reciprocity of visits and mentioned that if, for example, we went to see five of their sites, they would want to visit five of ours. Because the 12th Main Directorate sites lay outside any existing agreement, the Russians suggested the U.S. sites must also be sites that had not previously been subject to visits.

14. (S) It was clear that GOR had national security concerns and intelligence concerns and requested that the two sides conclude an information security agreement.

EXCHANGE OF BEST PRACTICES AND NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT

15. (S) The U.S. draft statement proposed a workshop or series of exchange on nuclear security best practices in which experts from the Departments of Defense Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would discuss common problems and solutions in the area of nuclear security. The U.S. mentioned that it has had such dialogues with other countries with advanced nuclear programs. Perhaps best practice discussions with Russia could evolve into multilateral discussions in the future.

16. (S) The Russian delegation, particularly Antonov of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was very positive about the prospect of exchanging best practices between the two governments and even more enthusiastic about involving other countries in such a dialogue. In his view, the United States and the Russian Federation know the most about securing nuclear material and should share that information. The Russians said that the proposed G-8 nuclear security summit was out of the question. They felt that it was stressful enough to host a G-8 meeting and surviving one without

enduring a heart attack would be the ultimate in "security." Antanov did think it was a good idea to mention the tenth anniversary of the G-7 nuclear safety summit in Moscow and to come out with a statement on nuclear security at that regular G-8 meeting.

Rumyantsev raises a new approach to plutonium disposition

17. (SBU) In response to a request for any Russian ideas on broadening cooperation, Rumyantsev said he had a new idea that was actually an old idea. Several years ago Russia had expressed interest in burning weapons plutonium in fast reactors, but the United States had been uninterested. In five years, nothing has happened on the mixed oxide (MOX) program while Russia had fast reactors that had burned an unspecified amount of weapons plutonium. Using their own funds Russia had completed 20% of the BN-800 fast breeder reactor. Russian plutonium disposition should be recast to focus on fast reactors. Brooks promised to study the proposal and respond at a later date.

18. (C) In the same context, Rumyantsev said that his biggest concern of all was the absence of an agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

SIDE DISCUSSIONS:

MAYAK FISSILE MATERIAL STORAGE FACILITY

19. (C) In a side conversation with Rumyantsev, Dr. Dale Klein of the U.S. Department of Defense brought up the issue of the Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility. The facility, built with DoD funds, remains empty of fissile material. Rumyantsev stated that the reason the facility has not become operational is inherently bureaucratic in nature. He promised that a letter would be provided to DoD in the near future stating that the DoD had fulfilled its obligations and turned over a functioning facility. It would then go on to say that the onus is on Rosatom to address the problem of moving material into the facility and lays out a schedule for doing so.

Antonov on plutonium disposition liability

20. (C) In a side discussion with Brooks, Antonov said that the recent U.S. proposal on plutonium disposition liability would not form a basis for an agreement. Antonov said U.S. draft was essentially the previous U.S. position with the right for the Russians to request an exception if they had proof about a specific individual. Putin had personally approved the Russian position on liability and the Russians could not go far beyond it. Russia already was being pressured by Europeans that if the United States were to get new liability provisions the Europeans would expect the same. Finally, Russia already had several different sets of liability provisions, including CTR, MNPR and the soon to be ratified Vienna Convention.

Talking points passed to Antonov

21. (SBU) At the conclusion of the meeting Brooks told Antonov that the need for the Russians to depart for the aircraft had left no time for a closing statement. Brooks passed over the text of draft closing remarks he would have made, noting that they did not fully reflect the discussions that had taken place.

BEGIN TEXT OF TALKING POINTS:

The United States still believes that there should be a joint statement issued at Bratislava that notes that the two Presidents renewed their commitment to cooperative work in nuclear security. It is certain, at least for our President, that this topic will be discussed extensively. We know that you will be preparing your President for these discussions as well. This exchange between our Presidents should be reflected in a public document. Both Presidents have made nuclear security a priority and the world will not understand their failure to note that fact.

We believe that the best statement to issue would be the text provided you by Secretary Rice. We understand, however, that some of our suggestions will require additional analysis by our Russian colleagues. We hope the clarifications provided today will help with that analysis.

Given this need, the United States suggests that Joint Statement containing the first three paragraphs of the draft

provided by Secretary Rice and a commitment to accelerate our joint work with Rosatom and the Ministry of Defense on warhead and nuclear material security might be a suitable outcome at Bratislava. A fact sheet alone, as some have suggested, appears to us not to capture the personal involvement of the two Presidents. Naturally, were we to agree on a joint statement, the United State would also be prepared to work on a fact sheet. We hope you take this suggestion back to Moscow and consider it carefully.

We also believe that the Presidential checklist should commit the two sides to follow up on the agreement to accelerate our joint work, and to reach agreement on a broader nuclear security initiative, based on the suggestions we have discussed today and any other proposals the Russian side might make. The checklist should commit us to a deadline to agree on the content of a new nuclear security initiative that the two Presidents can approve when they meet in Moscow in May of this year.

END TEXT OF TALKING POINTS.
Leach